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SRAM-based FPGAs are, however, susceptible to radiation
effects in space environments. The functionality of an FPGA
is dependent on the integrity of its configuration memory.
FPGA configuration memories are very large and are susceptible to errors caused by single event upsets (SEUs).

Abstract—Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is a common
reliability technique for FPGA designs used in radiation environments. TMR consists of triplicating a design and inserting
voters to mask errors using redundancy. This paper will investigate the automatic placement of voters in TMR designs.
In particular, it will introduce three algorithms for determining where to insert synchronization voters and compare the
area and timing impact of these algorithms on FPGA designs.
It will be shown that the placement of synchronization voters
in a triplicated design can have an important impact on the
area and timing characteristics of the resulting design. The
algorithms presented in this paper give results that increase
the critical path length of a design when adding TMR voters
by as little as 3% to as much as 50%.

Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is the most commonly
used mitigation technique against SEUs for FPGA designs
used in radiation environments. The basic concept of TMR is
to triplicate a circuit design so that the resulting design consists of three redundant copies of the original. Majority voters
are used to mask errors in any single copy of the circuit.
The insertion of voters is an important aspect of applying
TMR to a design. One of the more challenging design problems is deciding where to insert synchronization voters. Synchronization voters are used to keep the sequential logic state
of the three redundant copies of a circuit (domains) synchronized when there are SEUs that affect design feedback. In
order to keep a design synchronized properly, synchronization voters must be inserted in enough locations to intersect
all of the feedback in a design.
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TMR is often implemented by hand, and the process of properly inserting synchronization voters manually can be tedious
and error-prone. This paper will introduce three different algorithms for automatically determining suitable synchronization voter insertion locations. These algorithms have been implemented in an automated TMR tool developed at Brigham
Young University in collaboration with Los Alamos National
Laboratory [5]. While all three algorithms properly intersect
all design feedback with synchronization voters, they do so in
different ways. The choice of where to insert synchronization
voters affects how many voters are needed as well as the critical path length of a design. This paper will compare the three
synchronization voter insertion algorithms and show that the
choice of voter insertion locations has a significant impact on
both circuit area and timing performance.

1. I NTRODUCTION
SRAM-based FPGAs are an attractive alternative to ASICs
in space-based computing missions for several reasons. Their
reconfigurability allows them to be used to perform various
tasks at different times during a mission. FPGAs are often
used to implement custom designs that attain application specific performance that would not be possible with software
reconfigurable only alternatives. In addition, the use of FPGAs can reduce the overall non-recurring engineering (NRE)
costs involved in developing a space-based application [1],
[2], [3], [4].

2. FPGA S INGLE E VENT E FFECTS
The voter insertion algorithms presented in this paper are
motivated by FPGA implementations of the TMR technique.
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This section will summarize single event effect (SEE) issues
in FPGAs that make techniques such as TMR necessary in
FPGA designs for space-based missions. While FPGA manufacturers generally guarantee the total ionizing dose (TID)
life and single event latchup (SEL) immunity of their radiation hardened devices [6], the devices are susceptible to single
event upsets (SEUs). In an SRAM-based FPGA, an SEU occurs when a charged particle strikes an SRAM cell, causing
the state of the memory cell to change. SEUs are problematic for FPGAs because their configuration memories contain
millions of memory cells which makes them a large target for
SEUs.

read the configuration memory and check for errors using a
pre-computed CRC code. Upon detection of an SEU-induced
error, partial reconfiguration is used to repair the affected contents of the configuration memory. In this manner, bitstream
scrubbing corrects errors in the configuration memory soon
after they occur.
Although errors are corrected quickly, there is a finite amount
of time between the occurrence of an upset and the partial reconfiguration that corrects it. During this time, circuit functionality modified by the upset can cause errors in computation. Such errors can propagate to circuit outputs or feed back
into sequential logic state, causing incorrect circuit operation
to persist even after the effect of the SEU on the configuration
memory is corrected. In addition, bitstream scrubbing cannot address errors caused by SEUs in BRAMs and user flipflops because the correct value of the corresponding memory cells cannot be known unless redundancy is employed.
Bitstream scrubbing becomes a more effective mitigation approach when used in conjunction with an error masking technique such as TMR.

The functionality of an FPGA is dependent on the contents
of its configuration memory. FPGAs are typically made up
of highly configurable logic blocks containing lookup tables
(LUTs) that define logic functions and registers used for sequential logic. A reconfigurable routing network connects
the logic blocks in an FPGA in order to implement complex
designs. The contents of LUTs, the functionality of registers, and the routing network connections are all stored in
an FPGA’s configuration memory. The functionality of an
FPGA changes when the contents of its configuration memory change.

Triple Modular Redundancy
TMR is a well known technique for improving the reliability
of integrated circuits. Three redundant copies of a circuit are
created and majority voters are used to mask errors that occur
in any of the three copies (see Figure 1).

An SEU in an FPGA’s configuration memory affects only a
single bit of memory. However, a single bit flip can have significant consequences on FPGA functionality. For example,
a single bit flip in a LUT can change a boolean AND function
to a boolean function that always outputs a logical 0. A single
bit flip can also change the connections in the FPGA’s routing
network. The results of an SEU in an FPGA’s configuration
memory can be unpredictable.

Although TMR is often applied to designs manually, the process is straightforward enough to be implemented by an automated CAD tool. Existing tools for applying TMR to FPGA
designs include the Xilinx XTMR tool [9] and the BLTmr
tool developed at Brigham Young University in collaboration
with Los Alamos National Laboratory [5]. Using an automated tool can provide several advantages over implementing TMR by hand. For example, inserting voters in the proper
places manually can be a tedious and error prone process. Another pitfall when attempting to implement TMR manually
is that many synthesis tools remove redundant logic. This
issue is avoided by automated CAD tools that operate on a
post-synthesis circuit representation (i.e. EDIF netlist). One
further advantage of the BLTmr tool in particular is that it
allows for prioritized partial triplication of designs based on
target device size [10].

FPGAs are also sensitive to SEUs in Block RAMs (BRAMs)
and user flip-flops. BRAMs are often used as memories
or FIFOs in FPGA designs. User flip-flops are the registers in the FPGA that are instantiated in a design for use in
state machines, counters, and other sequential logic structures. BRAM and user flip-flop upsets can cause a design
to enter invalid states. Although these kinds of upsets are important, the configuration memory has a much larger cross
section and is more likely to receive SEUs.

3. M ITIGATION A PPROACHES

In a TMR system, majority voters are used to mask errors
that occur in any single copy of the circuit. In FPGAs, voters
are most commonly implemented using look-up tables. A
three input look-up table (LUT3) is sufficient to implement a
single majority voter. In general, triplicated voters are used to
avoid single points of failure. As shown in Figure 1, each of
the three voters takes an input from each domain and passes
outputs along to its respective domain.

The most common mitigation approach for FPGAs used in radiation environments is a combination of bitstream scrubbing
and TMR. Bitstream scrubbing corrects errors in an FPGA’s
configuration memory after they occur and TMR masks circuit functionality errors as they occur. When used together,
the two techniques improve reliability significantly.
Bitstream Scrubbing
SEUs in the configuration memory of an FPGA can be corrected by bitstream scrubbing [7], [8]. In bitstream scrubbing,
the FPGA’s configuration control logic is used to periodically
2

erally at circuit outputs) and clock domain crossing voters
mitigate TMR vulnerabilities created by clock domain crossing synchronizers. Optimal locations for other types of voters can be more difficult to determine. Partitioning voters
subdivide a circuit into TMR partitions for higher reliability.
Determining the optimal number and locations of partitions
is difficult. Synchronization voters keep the sequential logic
state of TMR domains synchronized when upsets in feedback
sections of a design occur. Determining optimal locations for
synchronization voters is also difficult.
Reducing Voters

Figure 1. Triplicated Voters

Reducing voters take outputs from three separate TMR domains as input and produce a single output. The most common use of reducing voters is at circuit outputs. Sometimes it
is desirable to have a single set of circuit outputs rather than
output all three TMR domains for external voting. This can
be necessary, for example, when the target FPGA has insufficient I/O resources to allow full triplication of the circuit outputs. In such a situation, reducing voters are used to reduce
three TMR domains to a single output as shown in Figure 3.

Reliability Modeling
Reliability modeling is important for determining the benefits
of using various reliability techniques. FPGA reliability can
be modeled using several methods, including combinatorial
modeling [11] and markov modeling [12]. In general, a nonredundant system is less reliable than a TMR system without repair (i.e. without bitstream scrubbing) for short mission
times. Overall, a TMR system with bitstream scrubbing is
much more reliable than both a non-redundant system and a
TMR system without repair. Figure 2 compares the reliability of three example systems with these configurations using
combinatorial and markov modeling techniques.

Figure 3. Reducing Voter

Reducing voters are also useful in partial TMR configurations. When partial TMR is used, there are circuit locations
where data must flow from a triplicated partition to a nontriplicated partition. Reducing voters are used at these locations to provide a single input to the non-triplicated partition.
TMR can also be mixed with duplication with compare
(DWC), an error detection technique which uses duplication
instead of triplication. In such a configuration, there are circuit locations where data must flow from a triplicated circuit
partition to a duplicated partition. At such locations, two reducing voters are used in parallel to reduce the three TMR
domains to two inputs for the duplicated partition.

Figure 2. Reliability Comparison for TMR

4. TMR VOTER I NSERTION
While the basic concept of TMR is straightforward, determining where to insert voters can be somewhat difficult. In
general, the reasons for inserting voters suggest where they
should be placed. For example, reducing voters are used to
reduce a signal from three domains to a single domain (gen-

Voter Partitioning
In a typical TMR system, errors that occur in the configuration memory are discovered and corrected by scrubbing. In a
circuit that has voters only at the outputs, errors are masked
3

as long as they occur in only one of the three TMR domains at
a time. If multiple errors occur fast enough such that they accumulate in more than one domain before being corrected by
scrubbing, the redundancy is overcome and errors can reach
circuit outputs. This vulnerability can be mitigated by subdividing the circuit into multiple partitions and applying TMR
to each partition separately. The partitions are separated with
triplicated voters.

counter in the domain in error. This domain would then continue to produce incorrect results even if the original error in
the circuit functionality were corrected via bitstream scrubbing. Such an error is called a persistent error [13] because
the state of the affected domain remains unsynchronized even
after the original error in the configuration memory is corrected. One way to recover from a persistent error is to reset
the design after the configuration memory has been corrected.
Resetting the design frequently is costly in terms of system
availability.

In a TMR system with multiple partitions, each partition can
tolerate errors in a single domain. That is, the system can tolerate concurrent non-overlapping failures (failures in separate
partitions and possibly separate domains). The reliability of
the circuit can be improved by subdividing it into smaller and
smaller partitions up to the point where the reliability gains
from partitioning are overridden by the unreliability of the
voters being added in between the partitions.
Clock Domain Crossing Voters
Special consideration is required when applying TMR to circuits with multiple clock domains. Clock domain crossing
synchronizers are a TMR domain synchronization hazard.
A typical clock domain crossing synchronizer consists of a
number of consecutive flip-flops to reduce the probability of
a metastable value propagating through the entire synchronizer. Because of the uncertainty associated with metastability, three synchronizers whose inputs transition at exactly the
same time do not necessarily propagate the correct output at
the same time. This means that TMR domains have the potential to be unsynchronized after clock domain crossing synchronizer outputs even without radiation effects. The problem is compounded by the fact that the inputs to the clock domain crossing synchronizers are three separate nets with three
separate timing paths. Even the synchronizer inputs may not
transition at exactly the same time.

Figure 4. Simple Counter

Synchronization voters provide a better solution than frequently resetting a design. Consider the same triplicated
counter as before but this time with triplicated voters inserted
in the feedback path (see Figure 5). The added voters mask
errors that would normally reach and remain in the state of
the affected domain. Errors that occur after the voters (i.e. in
the counter logic) can still cause incorrect values to reach the
counter registers, but they will be flushed out after the configuration memory error is corrected via bitstream scrubbing,
and the voters keep the errors from ever reaching the rest of
the design. Triplicated voters placed in design feedback paths
in this manner are called synchronization voters because they
keep the state of the three domains from becoming permanently unsynchronized by errors that would otherwise affect
design state in a persistent manner.

The problem that is created by TMR domains being possibly unsynchronized after clock domain crossing synchronizers is that it leaves the circuit vulnerable to SEUs. When only
two of the domains are synchronized, a single error in either
of them can cause an incorrect output that is not masked by
TMR. This is because a single TMR partition can tolerate errors in only a single domain at a time.
Several strategies for mitigating TMR circuits with clock domain crossings are being investigated. These strategies involve strategically placing voters in order resynchronize the
TMR domains after the clock domain crossing syncrhonizers.
Synchronization Voters

The placement of synchronization voters is the most difficult
voter placement issue to resolve automatically. Synchronization voters should be placed at locations that cut all design
feedback, but there are many ways to cut all of the feedback in
a design. In addition, synchronization voters can slow down a
design’s critical timing path. Algorithms for determining appropriate places to insert syncrhonization voters are discussed
in the next section.

Synchronization voters are used to keep the state of the three
TMR domains in a triplicated design synchronized in the face
of SEUs. Consider a simple triplicated counter with voters inserted only at design outputs (see Figure 4). If an error were
to occur in one of the domains, it would have the potential
to cause incorrect values to feed back into the state of the
4

Basic SCC Decomposition
The first algorithm considered is a simple decomposition of
strongly connected components (SCCs). The circuit netlist
is first converted to graph form and analyzed to find SCCs.
Then, the SCCs are decomposed into successively smaller
SCCs by removing feedback edges until there is no feedback
left in the circuit graph. Special consideration is made for
circuit locations where voters cannot be inserted due to architectural constraints. These locations are referred to as bad cut
edges. Pseudocode for the algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Basic SCC Decomposition Algorithm
Initialize list L
Initialize stack S
Perform SCC analysis
Push SCCs onto S
while S not empty do
current scc = S.pop()
Find back edges in current scc
if back edges are all legal cuts then
Remove all back edges from SCC
Save removed back edges to L
else if back edges are both bad and legal cuts then
Remove only legal cut back edges
Save removed back edges to L
Clear S
Recompute SCC analysis
Push SCCs onto S
else
Clear S
Perform SCC analysis with new vertex visit order
Push SCCs onto S
end if
end while
Insert voters on edges in L

Figure 5. Synchronized Simple Counter

5. S YNCHRONIZATION VOTER I NSERTION
A LGORITHMS
This section will present three different algorithms for determining where to insert synchronization voters. The insertion
of synchronization voters presents a particular challenge, especially for FPGA designs. In order to effectively mitigate
against persistent errors, all of the feedback paths in a design must be cut by triplicated voters. In a general sense, this
problem can be considered an instance of the feedback edge
set (FES) problem in which one is given a directed graph and
asked to find a minimum subset of edges that intersects every cycle in the graph. The unweighted version of the FES
problem is NP-hard [14].

The basic SCC decomposition algorithm correctly mitigates
against persistent errors by inserting voters that cut all design feedback, but no attempt is made to optimize the voter
locations to minimize the impact of voters on circuit area or
timing.

It is difficult to determine the best locations to insert synchronization voters because the choice has a significant impact on
the resulting circuit’s timing performance and area and because there are certain locations where voters cannot be inserted due to FPGA architectural constraints. When multiple
voters are placed in a single timing path, the performance of
the circuit is adversely affected. Voter insertion locations also
determine the total number of voters needed to cut all feedback and hence affect circuit area. The three algorithms presented in this section were implemented in the BLTmr tool at
Brigham Young University. They are the basic SCC decomposition algorithm, the highest fanout SCC decomposition algorithm, and the highest flip-flop fanout SCC decomposition
algorithm. Their impact on area and timing will be discussed
in section 6.

Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition
The highest fanout SCC decomposition algorithm is an attempt to reduce the number of voters used to cut feedback.
It is based on the fact that many circuit designs have some
high fanout nets. When a voter is inserted on a net with high
fanout, a significant amount of feedback can be cut with only
a single voter. The highest fanout SCC decomposition algorithm takes advantage of this by decomposing SCCs in a
manner that prioritizes the removal of the edges that can cut
the most feedback with the fewest voters. That is, each SCC
is analyzed to find the node with the highest legal cut fanout
and its legal cut output edges are cut first. Pseudocode for this
algorithm is given in Algorithm 2.
5

Algorithm 2 Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition Algorithm
Initialize list L
Initialize stack S
Perform SCC analysis
Push SCCs onto S
while S not empty do
current scc = S.pop()
Node n = Find node with highest legal cut fanout
Remove from graph the legal cut edges coming from n
Recompute SCC analysis of current scc subgraph
Push SCCs onto S
Save removed edges to L
end while
Insert voters on edges in L

(MAC) unit using a feedback loop. A MAC unit performs
a sum-of-products operation that is useful for computing a
convolution sum. Such a design can be used to implement a
FIR (finite impulse response) filter for signal processing applications.
The DES3 design implements a triple DES encrypter. Triple
DES is a block cipher used in cryptography applications. It
uses three keys and works by first encrypting data using the
first key, decrypting the data with the second key, and finally
encrypting the data with the third key. This design was chosen
because it is a computationally intensive real world application.
The QPSK design is a quadrature phase-shift keying (QPSK)
demodulator. QPSK is a digital modulation scheme used in
communications applications in which data is encoded using
the phase of the carrier signal. This design contains a fair
amount of feedback and is another computationally intensive
real world application.

It will be shown in section 6 that the highest fanout SCC
decomposition algorithm is indeed effective at reducing the
number of voters used but that it does not always provide
better timing results than the basic SCC decomposition algorithm.

The Synthetic design is a design that was crafted to contain
both feedback and feed forward logic. It consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) whose output is combined
with an input signal using a multiplier and an adder tree.
While it is not necessarily a real world application, it is useful
because it contains feedback (making synchronization voters
necessary) and uses a large portion of the resources available
on the target FPGA device. This is interesting because it results in routing congestion which makes it more difficult for
the place and route software to find a routing that meets timing constraints.

Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition
The highest flip-flop fanout SCC decomposition algorithm is
designed to both reduce the number of voters used to cut feedback over the basic SCC decomposition algorithm and minimize the impact of the voters on circuit timing. Voters can
negatively affect timing more than is necessary when more
than one set of voters is placed in a single path from one register to the next. This algorithm prevents this from happening
by decomposing SCCs as before but by prioritizing the removal of edges coming from flip-flop nodes with high legal
cut fanouts. Since a timing path consists of the logic from
one flip-flop to the next, inserting voters directly after flipflops ensures that only one voter will be inserted per timing
path. The pseudocode for this algorithm is the same as that
of the previous algorithm except that for each SCC the algorithm finds the flip-flop node with the highest legal cut fanout
instead of the node with the highest legal cut fanout overall.

The LFSRs design is another synthetic design that consists of
a large LFSR replicated ten times. It is interesting because
it contains a large amount of feedback, and the feedback inherent in an LFSR is of a fairly complex nature, meaning that
there are many possible synchronization voter configurations
for cutting the feedback.
Test Procedure

6. E XPERIMENTAL C OMPARISON OF
A LGORITHMS

Each of the test designs was triplicated using the automated
TMR tool developed at Brigham Young University. Each of
the three synchronization voter insertion algorithms was used
on each design. In all of the designs except the DES3 design, full triplication of all circuit elements and I/Os except
the clock was performed. There is a large amount of I/O in
the DES3 design, and there were insufficient I/O resources
on the target FPGA device to facilitate full triplication of the
inputs and outputs so they were left untriplicated. In each iteration of each design, the total number of voters inserted into
the design was recorded.

This section will present the results of applying TMR to a
suite of test designs using each of the three synchronization
voter insertion algorithms described in the previous section.
Both area and timing impact will be considered.
Designs
A suite of test designs including both real world and synthetic
designs was selected to test the effectiveness of the three synchronization voter insertion algorithms. Only designs that include some amount of feedback were selected since synchronization voters are unnecessary in feed forward only designs.

The target FPGA device for these experiments is the Xilinx
Virtex 1000 (XCV1000-5-bg560). Using a script to control
the Xilinx tool flow, a place and route was performed on each
iteration of each design using successively tighter timing con-

The MACFIR design implements a multiply accumulate
6

Original Design
Basic SCC
Decomposition
Highest Fanout
Decomposition
FF Fanout
Decomposition

Critical Path
Critical Path
Total Voters
Critical Path
Total Voters
Critical Path
Total Voters

MACFIR
14.7 ns
18.6 ns
219
18.5 ns
219
18.3 ns
219

QPSK
79.8 ns
120 ns
1188
90.2 ns
165
84.3 ns
96

DES3
10.9 ns
16.2 ns
543
14.9 ns
434
13.6 ns
352

Synthetic
9.8 ns
10.5 ns
720
11.2 ns
288
10.9 ns
324

LFSRs
11.9 ns
13.6 ns
570
13.7 ns
360
12.3 ns
450

Table 1. Synchronization Voter Insertion Algorithm Comparison Results

straints until the place and route run failed to find a routing
capable of meeting the timing constraint. In this manner, the
best possible critical path length for each iteration of each design was determined. Timing constraints were adjusted in 0.1
ns increments.

It is interesting to note that it is not always the case that the
best timing results are obtained by the algorithm that produces the lowest number of voters. The results for the two
synthetic designs illustrate this. This could be due to the nature of the feedback in these designs. Since the feedback in
both is due to LFSRs, which have a complex feedback pattern, there are many possible ways to cut all of the design
feedback. In a design where feedback is due to a simple
counter or state machine structure, cutting all of the feedback
is a simpler problem because the feedback loops are simpler.

Results
The results of the synchronization voter insertion algorithm
comparison experiments are given in Table 1. An analysis of
the results provides some useful insights about synchronization voter insertion.

Finally, the case of the MACFIR design is particularly interesting because all three algorithms produced the same number of voters, but the placement of the voters gave different
timing results for each algorithm. The highest flip-flop fanout
SCC decomposition algorithm gave the best timing results,
suggesting that the heuristic of inserting voters directly after
flip-flops employed by this algorithm is a good way to determine voter locations.

First, it is interesting to compare the number of voters produced by each algorithm. The basic SCC decomposition
algorithm consistently gives the highest number of voters.
The lowest number of voters is given by the highest flip-flop
fanout SCC decomposition algorithm in the QPSK and DES3
designs (two of the real world designs) while the highest
fanout SCC decomposition algorithm gives the lowest number of voters in both of the synthetic designs (Synthetic and
LFSRs). This could be due to the fact that the Synthetic and
LFSRs designs both have similar feedback patterns (due to
LFSRs) that are distinct from the feedback patterns in the
real world designs. This suggests that an adaptive algorithm
based on analyzing the type of feedback in a design could be
used for more effectively minimizing the number of voters in
a triplicated design when that is the primary focus.

7. C ONCLUSIONS
Because of its impact on area and timing performance, voter
insertion is an important issue when using TMR in FPGA
designs. Three algorithms for inserting synchronization voters have been described and compared based on experimental results. The highest flip-flop fanout SCC decomposition
algorithm provides the best results overall in terms of both
area and timing impact on the designs considered in this paper. On average, the increase in critical path length due to
inserted voters with this algorithm was 23% better than the
increase given by the best of the other two algorithms; the average number of voters inserted by the algorithm was 5% less
than the best of the other two algorithms.

Given the relatively low impact of voters on circuit area, it
is generally more likely that timing is the primary concern
when inserting synchronization voters. In all designs except
Synthetic, the best timing results are obtained by using the
highest flip-flop fanout SCC decomposition algorithm. This
is an expected result based on the fact that the highest flip-flop
fanout SCC decomposition algorithm is designed to minimize
the number of voters placed in a single timing path. Unexpectedly, the basic SCC decomposition algorithm produces
the best timing results for the Synthetic design. This could
be an anomaly due to the fact that the Synthetic design uses a
large portion of the target FPGAs resources, creating routing
congestion. Such congestion makes it much more difficult for
the place and route software to produce a routing that meets
timing constraints. In such conditions, place and route results
are often more arbitrary.

The problem of deciding where to insert voters to cut all design feedback is an instance of the feedback edge set problem
(FES), which is NP-hard. Algorithms exist for approximating
the weighted version of this problem [15]. One possible direction for future work could be to cast the problem of where
to insert synchronization voters as an instance of the weighted
FES problem using appropriate edge weights to try to minimize circuit area and timing impact. Existing approximation
algorithms could be used to provide solutions for such a problem.
7

TMR with bitstream scrubbing is an effective reliability technique for FPGA designs used in space-based missions. Inserting voters to ensure reliability can be a hard problem when
implementing TMR manually, but the highest flip-flop fanout
SCC decomposition algorithm presented in this paper provides an effective way of inserting voters automatically with
a low impact on circuit area and timing performance.

and M. Wirthlin, “SEU-induced persistent error propagation in FPGAs,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, vol. 52, no. 6 Part 1, pp. 2438–2445, 2005.
[14] R. Karp, Reductibility among combinatorial problems.
Univ. of California, 1972.
[15] G. Even, “Approximating minimum feedback sets and
multicuts in directed graphs,” Algorithmica, vol. 20,
no. 2, pp. 151–174, 1998.

R EFERENCES
[1]

D. Ratter, “FPGAs on Mars,” Xilinx, Tech. Rep., August 2004, xCell Journal #50.

[2]

M. Caffrey, “A space-based reconfigurable radio,” in
Proceedings of the International Conference on Engineering of Reconfigurable Systems and Algorithms
(ERSA), T. P. Plaks and P. M. Athanas, Eds. CSREA
Press, June 2002, pp. 49–53.

[3]

A. S. Dawood, S. J. Visser, and J. A. Williams, “Reconfigurable FPGAs for Real Time Image Processing in
Space,” in 14th International Conference on Digital Signal Processing (DSP 2002), vol. 2, 2002, pp. 711–717.

[4]

J. Villasenor and B. Hutchings, “The flexibility of configurable computing: Providing the hardware for dataintensive real-time processing,” pp. 67–84, Sept. 1998.

[5]

B. Pratt, M. Caffrey, P. Graham, K. Morgan, and
M. Wirthlin, “Improving FPGA design robustness with
partial TMR,” in 44th Annual IEEE International Reliability Physics Symposium Proceedings, 2006, pp. 226–
232.

[6]

Xilinx, “Radiation hardened Virtex-II QPRO 1.5V platform FPGAs: Introduction and overview,” Xilinx, Inc.,
San Jose, CA, Datasheet DS124-1, July 2003.

[7]

C. Carmichael, M. Caffrey, and A. Salazar, “Correcting single-event upsets through Virtex partial configuration,” Xilinx Application Notes, XAPP216 (v1. 0), 2000.

[8]

F. Lima, C. Carmichael, J. Fabula, R. Padovani, R. Reis,
X. Inc, and C. San Jose, “A fault injection analysis of
Virtex FPGA TMR design methodology,” in Radiation
and Its Effects on Components and Systems, 2001. 6th
European Conference on, 2001, pp. 275–282.

[9]

B. Bridgford, C. Carmichael, and C. W. Tseng, “Singleevent upset mitigation selection guide,” Xilinx Application Note XAPP987, vol. 1, 2008.

[10] K. S. Morgan, “SEU-Induced Persistent Error Propagation in FPGAs,” Master’s thesis, Brigham Young University, August 2006.
[11] D. Siewiorek and R. Swarz, Reliable computer systems:
design and evaluation. AK Peters, Ltd.
[12] D. McMurtrey, K. Morgan, B. Pratt, and
M. Wirthlin, “Estimating TMR reliability on FPGAs using markov models.” [Online]. Available:
http://hdl.handle.net/1877/644
[13] K. Morgan, M. Caffrey, P. Graham, E. Johnson, B. Pratt,
8

